

SMART NETWORKS

Henning Schulzrinne

(NSF workshop, Atlanta, GA – May 2017)




Secure
(self) Managed
Adaptive
Resilient
Transparent

Network economics, (over)simplified


% OF REVENUE

■ Equipment ■ Construction ■ Operations ■



90% of papers.

Complexity kills



IMS

General observations

- Economics, not capabilities
 - nobody was asking for IPv6 until addresses ran out
 - not clear anybody is asking for ICN, either
- Real-world challenges:
 - Can you build affordable networks to rural areas (other than satellite)?
 - Can you operate networks with no PhDs around?
 - Can you operate networks constantly under attack?
- Research is good at layering on complexity, not good at 99/5 solutions
 - still into saving bandwidth or hardware, not operations
 - how to quantify the trade-off?
 - examples: IP multicast, IP mobility

My guide posts

- Networking is a mature field – with enough money, can get any bandwidth anywhere at any time
- Networking is an infrastructure **engineering** discipline
- Where are there 10x *economic* opportunities?
- What is not working for users today?
- What are societal needs that are not being met?
- What has a chance to get beyond a conference paper?
- Can we formulate before-after scenarios?
 - “Today, we cannot **do** X. After we do research, X is available to users.”
 - “Today, we do not **understand** Y. After research, we do.”

Challenge 1: Lights-out network

- Home & small business networks largely self-managing
- Enterprise and carrier networks – not so much
- Configuration, fault diagnosis, performance management
- Architecture: where should complexity and generality reside?
 - e.g., should object storage and point-to-multipoint be network functions or application-layer functions?
- Goal: no more phone tech support
- Goal: if physical problem, fixed before user notices

Challenge 2: Self-secure networks

- Much larger diversity of software
 - not just 3-4 PC operating systems
 - hundreds of different IoT devices, printers, ...
- Not all Internet actors are trustworthy
 - see BGP routing
- Can we protect stupid (not just dumb...) devices?
- Can we protect the network and the user
 - DDOS and privacy violations?

Challenge 3: Spectrum-agile networks

- Essentially all spectrum below 6 GHz is in use
 - and much of the spectrum below 90 GHz (satellite, mainly)
- Unlicensed + licensed, but also unplanned + planned
- From 150,000 cell towers → 100 million mmWave radios
- Single frequency devices → $O(10)$ bands from 450 MHz to 38 GHz
- Many bands unlicensed → much better power control & frequency coordination
 - sliced & shared infrastructure
- How to detect sources of interference?